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1 
Legality and legitimacy in the European Union 
 
William Outhwaite  
‘L'Union...a su faire le saut technologique du pouvoir 
supranational, mais il n'y a toujours pas de légitimité 
supranationale.’ (Pascal Lamy, Le Temps, 28.8.09) 
 
A shorthand version of this paper would give the EU 10 points for legality (or 
maybe 9 to allow for endemic financial irregularities) but only 3 or 4 for legitimacy. 
Legality is the EU’s essence: set up by international treaties, operating through 
regulations and directives, and with its own legal corpus and court as one of its most 
successful institutional achievements.   
 
Legitimacy is, however, another matter.  In theory, the national and the 
supranational should complement each other in the EU like the two sides of a Euro 
coin.  (We could complicate the image by thinking of a polyhedron to represent 
multi-level governance.)  In practice, I suggest, the national and the European levels 
are not just in tension, which is to be expected, but undermine and delegitimate one 
another.  This has serious implications for projects, which I endorse, to encourage 
the development of a form of constitutional patriotism which can work for the 
European Union as a whole.
1
  
What sort of polity is the EU becoming?
2
  The shift in nomenclature, from  
‘Communities’ to ‘Union’, suggests progress towards the official goal, as stated in 
 
1
 As Habermas, in his reply to a recent collection of articles, believes it can. ‘The establishment of a 
European civic identity can be understood as the continuation of a process which takes place 
initially within the national state.  Even within these limits a well-understood constitutional 
patriotism has developed as a foundation of civic integration, in reaction to challenging 
historical experiences and along with the political-cultural incorporation of immigrant groups 
who remain connected with their countries of origin.’ Habermas Reply, in Niesen/Herborth 
(eds), Anarchie der kommunikativen Freiheit, p. 457. One might of course question both this 
account of what has happened at the level of the national state and its possible transnational 
extension. See also Nanz, Europolis, esp. ch. 6. For a more optimistic neo-Milwardian view 
of all this, see Menon/Weatherill, Transnational Legitimacy in a Global World.  The authors 
(p. 411) recognise the problems identified by Vivien Schmidt, which I discuss later.  
Conversely, while disagreeing with them overall, I agree that ‘the starting point of any 
interrogation of legitimacy in (but not simply of) the EU is properly the flaws of the member 
states…’(p. 404).   
2
 For a fuller discussion of this theme, see my recent book, Outhwaite, European Society, on which 
I have drawn here. I am grateful for comments when I delivered versions of this paper at 
Onati and again at a conference at Sussex organised by Gerard Delanty and Paul Blokker to 
mark the tenth anniversary of the European Journal of Social of Theory; this took place just a 
week after the ‘no’ vote in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. My thanks also to 
David Spence for comments on an earlier version of this chapter.   
2 
the treaties, of ‘ever closer union’, and there has indeed been such progress.  But 
rather like the development of social democracy in the twentieth century, the 
positive achievements tend to go alongside a scaling-down of the ultimate goals.
3
 
European federalism, like socialism, now seems to many Europeans either 
unattainable in the form in which it was originally conceived, or anyway 
undesirable. 
 
We should however go back to the beginning and ask what a European federation or 
confederation
4
 would be, and why Europeans might have wanted it in the second 
half of the twentieth century.
5
 The idea has of course a much longer history, but one 
important motivation for the project of European integration was in fact to prevent 
the Second World War happening again.  Two thirds of a century later, this aim 
seems quaint, and the idea of achieving it by, as a first step, coordinating the 
production of coal and steel between the former axis powers and some of their 
victims seems a roundabout route.  Yet this is what happened, and it substantially 
shaped later developments.   
 
It was also of course possible to want integration for its own sake, on the basis that, 
as Willy Brandt once said of divided Germany, that ‘what belongs together should 
grow together’. Europeans, on this view, have the basis for the sort of solidarity 
aspired to, and often achieved, by its national states, and this calls for an institutional 
expression of a similar kind, as in the great nineteenth century projects of German or 
Italian unification.  Somewhere between these two poles one can locate views about 
the need to form larger economic units, to solve economic and other problems for 
which the national state was too small.  
 
Postwar European integration began, then, with a fudge between motives of these 
kinds – an ambiguity which persists to the present.  The original institutional model 
of the Coal and Steel Community has shaped the whole subsequent evolution of the 
Union: a ‘high authority’ of nine members, a council of ministers and a 
parliamentary assembly. Finally there was a court and an advisory committee of 
what we would now call stakeholders. The assembly and the court subsequently had 
their scope extended to the EEC and EURATOM.  Half a century later, we now 
have a larger European Commission, a larger set of councils of ministers and the 
European Council of heads of state and government, a larger court and a ten times 
larger, directly elected parliament with substantially extended, though still very 
limited powers.
6
  
 
3
 Shore, Building Europe, ch. 1. 
4
 As Dario Castiglione points out, the EU remains ‘both open with regards to the forms of 
integration, and indeterminate in relation to its historical movement’, Castiglione, Reflections on 
Europe’s Constitutional Future, p. 393.  
5
 Stråth, A European Identity. To the Historical Limits of a Concept. 
6
 As Brunkhorst notes, the Parliament’s formal powers are actually quite extensive. The problem is 
 
3 
 
Whatever the merits of this design, it is clearly not the most obvious for a federation 
or confederation, where one would expect the executive authority to be subject to 
parliamentary control and for legislation to be passed by the parliament. 
Something like this was in fact proposed in the drafting of the European 
constitution, and the downgrading of the Council of Ministers was probably the 
proposal least acceptable to many member states.  In this, of course, they could 
justifiably claim to be following the majority views of their electorates whose main 
focus of attention and loyalty remains the national state.     
 
Should we just bite the bullet and call the EU a state, perhaps with a qualifying 
adjective such as ‘network’ or ‘regional’?7   
 
[T]he EU has developed a single currency, a single market, a single voice 
in international trade negotiation, a single anti-trust authority, common 
policies on environmental protection, worker safety and health, a common 
foreign and security policy, and even the beginnings of a common defense 
policy.  [Thus] While the use of the term state may … be difficult for 
classically trained IR theorists, there is no other word that does justice to 
the growing power and developing sovereignty – however contingent – of 
the EU.
8
  
 
Schmidt’s preference is for the term regional state; the focus of her book is on the 
impact of the EU on member-state polities.  Clearly one has to think of the EU 
polity or state as significantly constituted by its interrelations with national and 
subnational levels. In this sense, ‘multi-level governance’ is simply a fact. To invert 
Marx’s phrase: ‘Europe has changed; the point is to understand it’.   
 
Attempts to understand the European polity are however bound up with arguments 
for particular institutional designs, and it may be helpful to look at three of these.  
One of the boldest recent contributions is the political philosopher Glyn Morgan’s 
defence of The Idea of a European Superstate. Morgan deliberately takes the 
strongest and most provocative term in the ‘Eurosceptic’ vocabulary, demolishes 
some of the arguments for and assumptions about the desirability of a European 
state and then, in a startling volte-face, argues that we need it after all because only a 
unitary European state can provide the best available guarantee of security. Morgan 
admits however that ‘…a federalist European superstate is further from being a 
viable option today than at any time in Europe’s postwar history’.9    
 
 
its lack of a public profile. See Brunkhorst, Zwischen transnationaler Klassenherrschaft und 
egalitärer Konstitutionalisierung, pp. 343-4. 
7
 Schmidt, Democracy in Europe, p. 10 
8
 Schmidt, Democracy in Europe, p. 14 
9
 Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate. 
4 
An obvious alternative response is to abandon the already stalled integration project 
or to wind it back in an inter-governmentalist direction. A comparably bold proposal 
on these lines is offered by the historian John Gillingham.
10
 Gillingham’s strategy of 
‘hibernation’ and downsizing goes so far as to propose half-seriously the sale of 
some of the EU’s real estate in Brussels.  A rather more likely scenario, which may 
be what Gillingham really wants, would be limits to the expansion of EU activities 
and a future of stagnation.  Whether the EU bicycle, in Walter Hallstein’s 
memorable image, could stand up without moving forward, is another matter.   
 
There is however a third way, a growing body of literature which is accommodated 
to the EU in something like its present state. John A. Hall (2006) invokes the old 
Gaullist slogan of ‘l’Europe des patries’ in his argument for a steady state.11 For 
Rainer Lepsius, too, the national state remains the ‘central political object of 
identification’; the EU lacks the ‘interactive density and linguistic homogeneity’ 
required to make it an appropriate site for working out economic and cultural 
conflicts. ‘The integrative capacity of a society organised as a national state cannot 
be replaced by the new European structures’.12  
 
Hall and Lepsius are historical and political sociologists but, not surprisingly, much 
of this literature is produced by interdiscipinary legal experts such as Joseph Weiler.  
Weiler, in a classic discussion of Europe’s Sonderweg or special path, writes that 
‘Europe has charted its own brand of constitutional federalism. It works. Why fix 
it?’13 Weiler’s focus here is on constitutional law, but his view seems to be shaped 
by the relatively smooth operation of European legal integration as a whole.   
 
I agree with Habermas that law and democracy have to be seen in conjunction, and it 
is at the democratic end of the European polity that matters become more 
problematic.  The attention of European citizens is primarily focussed on national or 
regional, rather than European politics, and the transfer of power to the European 
level has mostly not been stressed by member state governments, except when they 
are seeking an excuse for unpopular policies. Where the policies are popular, 
national governments tend, not surprisingly, to take the credit themselves. Vivien 
Schmidt, in her exceptionally innovative study of the interface between European 
and national politics, concludes that ‘while the EU has policy without politics, the 
member-states end up with politics without policy in EU-related areas. And this 
makes for major problems for national democracy.’14   
 
 
10
 Gillingham, Design for a New Europe. 
11
 Hall, Plaidoyer pour l’Europe des Patries, pp. 107-124.    
12
 Lepsius, Prozesse der europäischen Identitätsstiftung, p. 5. 
13
 Weiler, Europe’s Sonderweg.  
14
 Schmidt, Democracy in Europe, p. 33. 
5 
The democratic deficit, in other words, is not only in the relatively unpolitical 
(though of course politically relevant) spheres of EU policy-making,
15
 with their 
confusing interplay of parliamentary, executive and legislative entities, but back 
home in the member states themselves, and also in non-members like Norway, who 
participate in the European Economic Area, Schengen etc. without even a formal 
place in EU non-politics.
16
  
 
National elections tend to be focussed on substantive policy issues that 
increasingly can only be fully addressed at the EU level, such as 
immigration, food safety, environment, or economic growth, while 
European Parliamentary elections tend to focus more on general polity 
issues that can only be resolved by nationally based actors, such as how to 
reform EU institutions – where, that is, they are concerned with EU issues 
at all …17 
This is not so much a ‘joint decision trap’ as what, borrowing from Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970), one might call a ‘non-decision trap’ – at least from the citizen’s point 
of view.
18
   
 
To speak of the European polity, then is to address not just the EU and the 
individual member states (including close associates like Norway and Switzerland) 
but, crucially, the interplay between them. Schmidt shows how essentially unitary 
states like the UK
19
 and France interact differently with the EU from more 
decentralised ones like Germany: ‘Europeanization … has been more disruptive to 
simple polities with unified structures like France and Britain.
20
     
 
15
 As Schmidt argues: ‘[N]ational partisan politics has been marginalized.  Ministers speak in the 
Council more in the name of the national interest than for governmental majorities.  Members of 
the EP speak more in terms of the public interest than for electoral majorities.  Citizens have more 
influence in Brussels when lobbying as organized interests than when voting or protesting in 
national capitals’ (Schmidt, V, Democracy in Europe, at note 7, p. 2).    
16
 See, for example, the Norwegian Study of Power and Democracy, part of a larger series of 
Nordic studies: www.sv.uio.no/mutr/english/index.html 
17
 Schmidt, Democracy in Europe, p. 33 
18
 Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty. 
19
 The UK, like Spain, has of course now substantial devolution (to Scotland and to a lesser extent 
to Wales), and the Blair government reversed Thatcher’s abolition of metropolitan institutions 
in London and elsewhere.  Its political style however remains essentially unitary, reinforced 
by a strongly majoritarian voting system in which coalitions have historically been rare. This 
may of course be about to change, with Brown, the British Medvedev, visibly running out of 
steam.    
20
 Schmidt, Democracy in Europe, pp. 54-5. The details of Schmidt’s analysis of her four states do 
not concern us here, but her concluding recommendations give a flavour of it:  ‘The French 
need to rethink their vision of leadership in Europe … given that they know that France no 
longer leads Europe, are in crisis over national identity, and increasingly blame EU 
“neoliberalism” for their economic problems.  The British need to develop a vision of Britain 
in Europe, given that the discourse of economic interest does not respond to growing 
concerns about sovereignty and identity, while the idea of British separateness in Europe 
could very well lead to the reality of British separation from Europe … The Germans need to 
 
6 
 
Schmidt’s diagnosis may seem worrying, but her conclusion is relatively optimistic.  
As long as we recognise that the EU should be seen as a regional state and do not try 
to democratise it according to the model of national democracies, we can live with 
something like its present arrangements. ‘Its “federal” checks and balances, its 
voting rules ensuring supermajorities, its elaborate interest intermediation process 
with the people, and its consensus politics go very far toward guaranteeing good 
governance for the people.’21 All that is needed is for the member states to recognise 
this and adapt their political discourse and practices accordingly.  
 
In a related approach, Jan Zielonka and others have presented a vision of the EU as a 
kind of empire, more specifically a neomedieval one in which political authority is 
divided and multiple, not clearly nested as in idealised descriptions of feudalism, but 
a messier picture of competing sovereignties, statuses and rights. Zielonka’s book is 
substantially concerned with Eastern enlargement, since ‘it is the European 
integration project that needs to be adjusted to enlargement, and not the other way 
around.’22   
 
Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss adopt a similar answer to ‘The Problem of Legitimacy 
in the European Polity’. They start from a similar point to Schmidt: ‘the problem is 
not primarily that the EU must become democratic; it is that member states must 
remain democratic’.23 They suggest the deliberately paradoxical image of a 
republican empire.   
 
The appeal of a model of this kind is of course its flexibility, which Ulrich Beck and 
others have linked to a cosmopolitan vision that transcends old-fashioned 
oppositions between inside and outside, us and them.
24
 Against this happy vision, 
however, the negative votes on the European constitution in France and the 
Netherlands, two states involved from the beginning in the integration project and 
generally reckoned among the most favourably inclined to it, carry a powerful 
lesson.
25
   
 
update their vision of “German-as-European” in light of the changes related to unification and 
fading memories of World War II, especially since they increasingly question the benefits of 
membership and worry about the EU’s impact on the social market economy.  The Italians … 
need to concern themselves not so much with their vision of Italy in Europe as with their 
implementation of European rules in Italy, since their pride in being European is likely to 
suffer as a result of the fact that the EU “rescue of the nation-state” is no longer enough to 
rescue the nation-state.’ Ibid, p. 272. 
21
 Schmidt, Democracy in Europe, pp. 22-3. 
22
 Zielonka, Europe as Empire. This book is also a superb guide through recent literature on the EU. 
See also Verdun/Croci, The European Union in the Wake of Eastern Enlargement.  
23
 Offe and Preuss, The Problem of Legitimacy in the European Polity. 
24
 Beck and Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa; Lavenex, EU external governance in “wider 
Europe”. 
25
 Van der Pijl, A Lockean Europe? p. 36. 
7 
 
The problem, then, as many see it, is that it may be impossible to democratise the 
EU without undermining the democratic states which make it up.
26
 Yet other federal 
polities manage this, with only occasional grumbles in Bavaria, Texas or the Valais 
about goings-on in the national capitals.  But to speak like this, Euro-realists would 
say, is to fail to grasp the reality of the EU, where legitimating structures are 
inevitably embedded at national level and the pursuit of a stronger European identity 
is a dangerous diversion.
27
   
 
The problem of the EU polity, then, is essentially that of its decoupling from society, 
which reproduces in spades the alienation of the national political sphere diagnosed 
by Marx in the nineteenth and by Régis Debray in the twentieth century.
28
 Delanty 
and Rumford point to the similarities between European and global politics: ‘In 
Europe, as in the world polity more generally, cultural control is exerted by those 
who are seen to work for the common good rather than self-interest, framing their 
calls for development, progress, standardization, and rational organization in terms 
of the potential benefits to everyone.’29 The European polity thus displays in 
microcosm the tension between the rhetorical cosmopolitisation and democratisation 
of modern politics, the latter marked also by the informal style of leaders like Blair, 
Bush, Sarkozy and Berlusconi, and the increasing alienation of marginalized and 
excluded populations, which in the European context tends to be expressed at best in 
hostility to the European project and at worst in a generalised xenophobia.
30
 The 
pursuit of European integration was always, in a phrase applied to fascism, an 
‘extremism of the centre’. In its well-meaning but arrogant elitism it has now 
generated an anti-European extremism which may be spreading from the extreme 
right to the mainstream.  Something, I think, does have to be done.        
 
Having outlined the issues as I see them, I shall end with a few remarks more 
directly on the question of legitimacy. It is not surprising that the discussion of the 
EU’s legitimation problems has largely repeated two motifs I grew up with as a 
young academic in the 1970s: output legitimacy, somewhat dismissively treated in 
the literature of the time as conducing merely to ‘mass loyalty’ rather than 
legitimacy,
31
 and procedural legitimation.
32
  The early functionalist justifications of 
 
26
 As David Bailey points out, studies of European integration might benefit from paying more 
attention to critical state theory, drawn from, among other sources, Marx and Foucault, which has 
consistently addressed contradictions generated by forms of governance themselves and what have 
been called ‘crises of crisis management’; Bailey, Governance or the crisis of governmentality?   
27
 Weiler, Europe’s Sonderweg; Scharpf, Legitimationskonzepte jenseits des Nationalstaats.    
28
 Debray, Critique de la raison politique. More recently, see Crouch, Post-Democracy; Ginsborg, 
Democracy.  Crisis and Renewal; Wolin, Democracy Incorporated. 
29
 Delanty, and Rumford, Rethinking Europe. 
30
 Bale, Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and the extreme right in Europe’s 
bipolarising party systems. 
31
 Narr and Offe, Wohlfahrtsstaat und Massenloyalität. 
32
 Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren. 
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European integration were cast in terms of beneficial outcomes, and this is 
continued in the EUROPA site’s current list of ‘50 ways forward. Europe’s best 
successes’.33 The second, procedural aspect has again, as I noted at the beginning, 
been central throughout to a union initiated by treaties and substantially advanced by 
them.  Whatever we like to think of as the life-blood of the Union, its sinews are 
surely legal.   
 
The domestic discussion of legitimation seems to have died out at roughly the same 
time, in the 1980s, as attention focused on the European ‘democratic deficit’.  But as 
David Spence notes, ‘If there is a democratic deficit, there must also be a legitimacy 
deficit.’34 What Europe, in the sense of what was becoming the EU, lacked was 
something which, following Michael Billig’s brilliant discussion of banal 
nationalism, we might call banal nationalist legitimation. The composition of many 
of the member states may have been contested, but except in the case of Belgium 
(which has not (yet) broken up) and Czechoslovakia (which did), the contestation is 
largely peripheral, in the sense that it is only on the peripheries (Scotland, the 
Basque Country, etc.) that the unity of the respective states is radically questioned. 
On the whole, the identity of the state and hence a sort of zero degree of legitimacy 
has been taken for granted.  In the case of the EU, however, it is not difficult to find 
voices calling for withdrawal, or even predictions of the dissolution of the Union.  
[The counterpoint to this secessionist threat is the more Europeanist or integrationist 
question whether the Union might be better off without some prospective member 
(e.g. Turkey) or an existing one (notably the UK, whose size makes its incorrigible 
obstructionism particularly irritating and dangerous).
35
  
 
The institutional architecture of the EU is also up for grabs in a way which that of 
the member states is not.  The states may move back and forth between PR and 
majority voting, between less or more centralisation, but radical alternatives such as 
those represented by Fischer and opposed by Blair in the 2000 discussion,
36
 or 
 
33
 See: www.europa.eu/success50/index.  
34
 Spence, EU Governance and Global Governance: New Rules for EU Diplomats, p. 70. 
35
 Glyn Morgan suggests that the issue is not so much of legitimacy as of the basic justification of 
the European project; see Morgan, European Political Integration and the Need for 
Justification.  
36
 Fischer’s speech is reprinted and commented in Joerges, C, Mény, Y and Weiler, JHH, ‘What 
Kind of constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/OnlineSymposium/JoschkaFischer.shtml (2000). Fischer 
envisaged a second chamber of the European Parliament made up of ‘elected deputies who 
are also members of the national parliaments’ but left open the question whether a future 
European government should emerge from the Council or from the Commission (with a 
directly elected President). No doubt his preference, like mine, would be for the latter. This 
classically Weberian proposal for the presidency is of course open to familiar objections, but 
perhaps with less reason at the European level. Italy might elect a Berlusconi, or Poland a 
Kaczynski, but Europe as a whole is surely less likely to. Blair’s characteristically Thatcherite 
response was that ‘The primary sources of democratic accountability in Europe are the 
directly elected and representative institutions of the nations of Europe, national parliaments 
 
9 
between Morgan and Gilligan in the more recent past, are largely absent. The 
principle of majority voting, which is largely unquestioned within the member 
states,
37
 is a permanent bone of contention at the European level. The option of 
withdrawal for dissatisfied minorities, which is presented as hypothetical in the 
domestic context and a serious possibility only for minorities of regional separatists, 
remains a real option at the European level, where it cannot be taken for granted that 
we are together for ever.    
 
The tide is flowing fairly clearly in the direction of majority voting, but it is less 
clear that there is a move towards what we might call a normal democracy at the 
European level.  Three independent but complementary options are 
parliamentarisation, a directly elected president and a greater use of referendums.  
The last two can be seen as offering a plebiscitary corrective to an inevitably 
complex and bureaucratic federal system,
38
 where even parliamentary assemblies are 
at several interrelated levels. Such assemblies, along with multifarious committees, 
may be optimistically seen as approaching the desiderata of deliberative democracy, 
but they fail to offer clear-cut choices between political alternatives to a European 
electorate.
39
  
 
Without serious progress in this direction,
40
 the attention to elements and fora of 
deliberative democracy at the European level, like the comforting efforts of Beck 
and Grande,
41
 in what remains an extremely important contribution the debate, to 
square all possible circles, risk appearing as a diversion.  If there is a European 
legitimation crisis, as I believe there is, it has at least two elements - in Eurospeak 
we might say pillars.  One is structural and institutional: it concerns the 
intergovernmental and technocratic foundations of the original Communities, set up 
without significant input from European populations who were merely expected to 
marvel at the cargo of benefits emerging from integration.  On the whole this 
worked: the integration process advanced by fits and starts, and the European 
economy, even after the oil shock of the mid-1970s, provided a large enough cake to 
mitigate squabbles over relative shares.
42
 But European capitalism has become more 
 
and governments’ (cited in Kohler-Koch/Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic 
Legitimacy of the European Union, 102. 
37
 An excellent edited collection by Guggenberger and Offe (eds), An den Grenzen der 
Mehrheitsdemokratie, does address fundamental issues, including those posed by protest 
movements, but makes no mention of European-level politics, even in the chapter (by Heidrun 
Abromeit) on federalism. More recently, see Abromeit, Democracy in Europe: Legitimizing Politics 
in a Non-State Polity. 
38
 Abromeit’s chapter on federalism uses the term ‘Ventil’. 
39
 Brunkhorst, The Legitimation Crisis of the European Union, p. 174. 
40
 See also the editors’ introduction to Kohler-Koch/Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic 
Legitimacy of the European Union, and the volume as a whole.  
41
 Beck and Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa,. 
42
 Along with economic growth, the Soviet threat provided the other crucial element determining 
the progress of integration.  
10 
irresponsible and dangerous and a justified suspicion of European political elites 
increasingly also takes a dangerous populist form.
43
 One Berlusconi government 
might be an accident; three looks like carelessness. The other element of the crisis is 
the weakness of European civil society and the commercial degradation of the 
European public sphere, just as it becomes more pan-European and global in its 
possible scope.
44
  The two elements reinforce one another: a European civil society 
has nothing to get its teeth into because many of the most important issues of 
welfare and social policy are still a chasse gardée for the member states. 
 
The question, then, is whether it is possible to have more democratic legitimacy at a 
European level without further weakening the democracy of the national states and, 
where they have them, of their regional assemblies.
45
  My provisional answer is to 
say that federal systems are inevitably messy, but the mess can be creative.  The 
question can I think be turned round: the presence of a manifestly undemocratic set 
of structures at a European level cannot fail to undermine an already shaky 
identification of modern Europeans with democratic parliamentary politics.  The 
danger is of European politics, like the fish, rotting from the head down.   
 
 
43
 We should not perhaps have been surprised at the collapse of UK and US banks in 2007-8, but to 
see the irresponsibility and corruption also affecting such apparently respectable institutions 
as German Landesbanken was genuinely alarming.  
44
 As Ulrich Haltern writes ‘…European democracy will not work – in that it will not lead to a 
vibrant transnational political life – unless European citizens understand, and are convinced of, the 
communal, collective dimension of a European political community’;  Haltern, in Kohler-
Koch/Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, p. 51. On the 
European public sphere in relation to this issue, see e.g. the report by Sifft, et al., Segmented 
Europeanization: Exploring the Legitimacy of the European Union from a Public Discourse 
Perspective, and the literature cited there; see also Eder and Trenz TITLE?? in Kohler-
Koch/Rittberger (eds), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, and Kohler-
Koch’s own chapter in this volume, esp. pp. 267-8. 
45
 Hauke Brunkhorst sounded an early warning here: ‘The already well advanced state of European 
constitutionalisation increases the chance of a transition from a weak European public sphere to a 
really strong one, but also the danger of a constitutionally entrenched de-democratisation of Europe 
and its nations’. Brunkhorst, Verfassung ohne Staat? p. 531. See also the view in Nanz, Europolis, 
at note 1, p. 181:  ‘Without citizen support for democratic practices and identification with political 
institutions, the EU risks – at best – creating an environment of post-political consumer loyalty.’ 
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